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This article provides a locally grounded understanding of how geographies of sovereignty became
established and called into question on the external frontiers of British imperial expansion. The empirical
case study focuses on the Bhotiyas, trans-Himalayan traders who reside in several high valleys of the
Kumaon Himalaya in today's North Indian state of Uttarakhand. When the British East India Company
annexed that region in 1815 it was recognized as a so-called Non-Regulation Province. Through a close
examination of British interactions with Kumaon's traders, the paper will reveal the frictions that arose
from this exceptional legal status. This focus serves to address the broader question of how sovereign
claims work through multiple and shifting articulations. The paper ﬁrst considers the establishment of
Kumaon as a Non-Regulation Province by attending to the strategies of British administrators in gaining
the loyalty of its trans-Himalayan traders, particularly after the Dogras' invasion of western Tibet in 1841.
Subsequently, attention turns toward the negotiations between colonial administrators, Tibetan au-
thorities and the Bhotiyas over taxation, which highlights British efforts to ﬁt this mountainous pe-
riphery into the empire's standard grid during the 1890s. The analysis considers a previous call to
conceive High Asia as a continuous zone and an agentive site of political action by arguing that conﬂuent
territories and overlapping sovereignties are key to understanding imperial frontiers. As such the article
contributes to scholarship that deals with the anomalous spaces of Britain's Indian empire, including
both the jurisdictional and everyday politics in the margins.
© 2015 The Author. Published by Elsevier Ltd. This is an open access article under the CC BY-NC-ND
license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).During its ﬁrst great surge of territorial expansion between 1770
and 1830, the British East India Company made several attempts to
access the Tibetan plateau. Warren Hastings, the ﬁrst governor
general of India, set the ball rolling in 1774 when delegating his
private secretary, George Bogle, to lead an initial expedition from
Bengal to Shigatse.1 In 1783 Hastings built on the ﬁrst mission's
success by appointing his cousin, lieutenant Samuel Turner, to
further develop relations with the political elites of this remote
mountain polity.2 However, numerous obstacles, including active
opposition from Tibetan aristocrats, frustrated any lasting access.
The central Himalayan kingdoms of Garhwal and Kumaon attractedf George Bogle to Tibet, and of
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td. This is an open access article uincreasing British attention as gateways to Tibet after they were
conquered by the Gorkhas, a ruling power from Nepal, in 1790. One
of the early British agents exploring these two polities in 1812
publicly denounced the Gorkhas as being an exploitative and
oppressive regime.3 He further highlighted the area's commercial
signiﬁcance and his favourable experiences with its trans-
Himalayan traders. In 1814 the British East India Company waged
war on the Gorkhas, whose defeat was sealed with the Treaty of
Segauli the following year (ratiﬁed in 1816).4 The western half of
the Garhwal kingdom was returned to the former ruling dynasty
that then staffed the newly established princely state of Tehri
Garhwal. The Company, however, annexed the signiﬁcantly larger
part to the east, which was renamed as British Garhwal and
Kumaon (hereafter referred to as Kumaon), and recognized as a so-3 W. Moorcroft, A journey to Lake Manasarovar in Undes, a province of Little
Tibet, Asiatic Researches 12 (1818) 393.
4 See J. Pemble, Britain's Gurkha War: The Invasion of Nepal, 1814e16, London,
2008.
nder the CC BY-NC-ND license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).
8 During the so-called Great Game Britain and Russia were rivals for political
ascendancy in Central Asia. This conﬂict evolved after Napoleon's army retreated
from Russia in 1813 and lasted approximately until the Russian October Revolution
in 1917. The Great Game had several heightened periods, of which the turn of the
twentieth century was one. It was at this time that the British invaded Tibet and
thereafter established it as a buffer state. See D. Anand, Strategic hypocrisy: the
British imperial scripting of Tibet's geopolitical identity, Journal of Asian Studies 68
(2009) 227e252.
9 C.W. Brown, What we call ‘Bhotiyas’ are in reality not Bhotiyas: perspectives of
British colonial conceptions, in: M.P. Joshi, A.C. Fanger, C.W. Brown (Eds), Himalaya:
Past and Present, Vol. II, Almora, 1992, 147e172.
10 C. Bergmann, M. Gerwin, W.S. Sax and M. Nüsser, Politics of scale in a high
mountain border region: being mobile among the Bhotiyas of the Kumaon Hima-
laya, India, Nomadic Peoples 15 (2011) 104e129.
11 Borax (also referred to as tincal) is a mineral from the saline lakes on the Ti-
betan plateau. European porcelain manufacturers used it as a mordant in dyeing
processes.
12 See C. Johnson, R. Jones, A. Paasi, L. Amoore, A. Mountz, M. Salter and C.
Rumford, Interventions on rethinking ‘the border’ in border studies, Political Ge-
ography 30 (2011) 61e69; T.M. Wilson and H. Donnan, Borders and border studies,
C. Bergmann / Journal of Historical Geography 51 (2016) 88e98 89called Non-Regulation Province. This legal status was maintained
after the region's incorporation into the larger administrative unit
of the North-Western Provinces in 1836, whereby Kumaon became
subsumed under the overall jurisdiction of a lieutenant governor.
Through a close examination of British interactions with
Kumaon's trans-Himalayan traders, this paper will reveal the fric-
tions that arose from the exceptional legal status of the area as a
Non-Regulation Province. This serves to address the broader
question of how sovereign claims work through everyday and
multiple articulations on imperial frontiers. When the British East
India Company moved into these remote and inaccessible (tribal)
areas, ﬁrst-hand experiences of local conditions confounded earlier
images of India as a uniform agrarian society.5 In some places, in
order to effectively deal with changing local contexts the colonial
government suspended the full application of imperial law, com-
plex bureaucratic procedures and separation of powers. Non-
Regulation provinces such as Kumaon were administered not by
the rule of law but rather ‘by discretion or executive interposition’.6
In practical terms this meant that the commissioners of such
provinces were muchmore powerful than their counterparts in the
regulated areas. Whilst being expected to orient their rule toward
the applicable acts and regulations of the colony, these government
ofﬁcials ﬂexibly interpreted executive orders to suit the realities on
the ground. Procedural simplicity and discretionary decisions
created scope for both shaping and contesting British hegemony,
leading to an adaptive transformation of imperial power and au-
thority. By tracing these adaptive transformations as they occurred
in nineteenth-century Kumaon, this article provides a locally
grounded understanding of how geographies of sovereignty
became established and called into question on the external fron-
tiers of British imperial expansion.
The empirical analysis proceeds in two parts. The ﬁrst part
scrutinizes the strategic efforts of British administrators to derive
economic and political beneﬁts from the East India Company's new
territorial gain. Due to Kumaon's exceptional legal status, British
ofﬁcers were relatively free to mould their rule. They conceived
suitable means to gain the loyalty of the region's trans-Himalayan
traders, the Bhotiyas. Their strategy became particularly visible
when the Dogras e a subsidiary of the powerful Sikh kingdom that
rivalled the British in the Punjabe invadedwestern Tibet in 1841. In
order to prevent both the spillover of conﬂict to British territory and
a total standstill of trans-Himalayan trade, the then commissioner
of Kumaon attempted to gain the traders' favourable attention
through a remission of taxes. It was expected that local traders
would then become inclined to further British interests in western
Tibet with a minimum of assistance or ﬁnancial burden. Indeed, the
overall strategy seemed to pay off when trade volumes increased
sharply over the following decades.
The second part of the article considers the negotiations over
territoriality and sovereignty that were triggered by a dispute over
taxation between colonial administrators, Tibetan authorities and
regional traders during the 1890s. It was during this time that
Kumaon's administrative practice transitioned toward the appli-
cation of a more formal rule of law, a process that was concluded
only in 1925.7 Trans-Himalayan traders traditionally paid taxes on
land to Tibetan authorities. The British tolerated such practices so
as not to disrupt commerce across the high mountain passes.
Amidst the heightened tensions of the so-called Great Game, a5 See R. Guha, Environment and Ethnicity in India, 1200e1991, Cambridge, 1999,
130e149.
6 B.B. Misra, The Bureaucracy in India: An Historical Analysis of Development up to
1947, Delhi, 1977, 81.
7 A.K. Mittal, British Administration in Kumaon Himalayas, New Delhi, 1986, 25.British major general witnessed these transactions personally and
thereafter initiated a quest for newgovernment intervention aimed
at enforcing the empire's territorial sovereignty in Kumaon.8 The
traders were portrayed as both undermining British authority and
abusing their position as British subjects. Furthermore, they were
seen as preferring to accede to the sway of the barbarian Tibetan
rulers, with whom they conspired to oppose British plans for
bringing the trans-Himalayan trade under the full control of the
empire. The Tibetan authorities and the traders capitalized on the
fact that British regulation would be hampered by the remoteness
and harsh environmental conditions of the region, and they
therefore made a strong claim for the maintenance of their tradi-
tional arrangements.
The British administration referred to the trans-Himalayan
traders in Kumaon as ‘Bhotiyas’, a term that was eventually
applied to a great variety of groups.9 Today, the Bhotiyas of Kumaon
reside in the four high valleys of Johar (or Gori), Darma, Chaudans
and Byans, situated within the Indian state of Uttarakhand (see
Fig. 1). People from these valleys were actively involved in the
trans-Himalayan trade.10 They exchanged mainly sugar, grains and
manufactured wool products from the Lesser Himalaya for salt,
wool, animals and borax from the Tibetan plateau.11 Large ﬂocks of
sheep and goats as well as yaks and yak-crossbreeds were used as
pack animals. Using the example of these traders, this article con-
tributes to a broader debate over the roles of frontiers and borders
as agentive sites of political action.12 In such regions, actors tailor
varying and often also conﬂicting articulations of sovereignty in
order to stake a claim within changing spatialities of power.13 This
research perspective has recently gained new impetus from
scholars pointing to the Himalaya as a continuous zone character-
ized by long-term and intricate negotiations over territoriality and
sovereignty.Approaching territoriality and sovereignty in the Himalaya
Many of the groups residing in the High Himalaya were, and to a
lesser extent still are, involved in a vast network of cultural and
commercial relations that link the Indo-Gangetic plain with the
Tibetan plateau and Central Asia.14 Fisher introduced the concept ofin: T.M. Wilson, H. Donnan (Eds), A Companion to Border Studies, Chichester, 2012,
1e25.
13 For a synopsis of recent scholarly debates on the issue of sovereignty see F.
McConnell, Sovereignty, in: K. Dodds, M. Kuus, J. Sharp (Eds), The Ashgate Research
Companion to Critical Geopolitics, Farnham, 2013, 109e128.
14 See W. van Spengen, Tibetan Border Worlds: A Geohistorical Analysis of Trade and
Traders, London, 2000; T. Harris, Geographical Diversions: Tibetan Trade, Global
Transactions, Athens, GA, 2013.
Fig. 1. The Kumaon Himalaya and the valleys inhabited by the Bhotiyas.
17 W. van Schendel, Geographies of knowing, geographies of ignorance: jumping
scale in Southeast Asia, Environment and Planning D: Society and Space 20 (2002)
647e668. van Schendel derived the neologism ‘Zomia’ from zomi, a term signifying
‘highlander’ in a number of Chin-Mizo-Kuki languages that are spoken in the
C. Bergmann / Journal of Historical Geography 51 (2016) 88e9890a ‘neither-ﬁsh-nor-fowl contact zone’ to characterize the ‘Indo-Ti-
betan interface’.15 Residents of this region were viewed as Janus-
faced brokers whose cultural ﬂexibility was considered a major
advantage for the trans-Himalayan trade. This advantage was
augmented by the traders' geographical location. Situated at the
crux of two very different agro-ecological zones e the arid Tibetan
plateau in the north and the subtropical middle hills of the Lesser
Himalaya in the south e they played a central role in facilitating
commerce for both sides. In other words, it was accepted that
altitude, ecology and culture together shaped the complex trading
patterns upon which groups such as the Bhotiyas relied.16
While scholars from various disciplines have embraced the
prospect of such a laboratory-like setting, the model has one major
shortcoming: it depicts trans-Himalayan traders as if their lives and
livelihoods developed in relative isolation from broader processes
of political change. To avoid this shortcoming a gradual rethinking
has taken place in recent years. Much of the discussion is anchored
in van Schendel's proposal to conceive High Asia under a single15 J.F. Fisher, Introduction, in: J.F. Fisher (Ed), Himalayan Anthropology: The Indo-
Tibetan Interface, The Hague, 1978, 1.
16 For a critical discussion of the concept ‘Indo-Tibetan interface’ see S. Shnei-
derman, Are the Central Himalayas in Zomia? Some scholarly and political con-
siderations across time and space, Journal of Global History 5 (2010) 289e312.rubric, for which he suggests the neologism ‘Zomia’.17 Although this
‘world area’ covers large parts of Central (Inner), South, East and
Southeast Asia, it had become a blind spot in their histories. To
counter this scholars are now trying to envision the border regions
of High Asia as a continuous zone ‘rather than as disconnected
spaces at the peripheries of individual nation-states’.18 Scott, for
instance, analyzes how the realization of mountain livelihoods in
Southeast Asia was historically tied not only to dynamic processes
of state formation in the lowland centres, but also geared toward
the creation and maintenance of ungoverned non-state spaces in
the uplands.19 Scott's version of Zomia dismantles the dominant
paradigm of Southeast Asian scholarship as a state-centric visionborderlands of India, Burma and Bangladesh.
18 S. Shneiderman, Himalayan border citizens: sovereignty and mobility in the
Nepal-Tibetan Autonomous Region (TAR) of China border zone, Political Geography
35 (2013) 28. See also D. Gellner, Northern South Asia's diverse borders, from
Kachchh to Mizoram, in: D. Gellner (Ed), Borderland Lives in Northern South Asia,
Durham, 2013, 1e23.
19 J.C. Scott, The Art of Not Being Governed: An Anarchist History of Upland Southeast
Asia, New Haven, 2009.
25 S. Legg, Of scales, networks and assemblages: the League of Nations apparatus
and the scalar sovereignty of the Government of India, Transactions of the Institute of
British Geographers 34 (2009) 234e253; S. Legg, An international anomaly? Sov-
ereignty, the League of Nations, and India's princely geographies, Journal of His-
torical Geography 43 (2014) 96e110.
C. Bergmann / Journal of Historical Geography 51 (2016) 88e98 91which neglects the manifold histories, forms of agency and political
agendas of those residing in the mountains.
Scott understands upland Southeast Asia historically as a ‘non-
state space’. People who tried to evade state rule took advantage of
altitude, poor infrastructure and other ‘frictions of terrain’, which
they ampliﬁed by adopting mobile livelihoods and ﬂuid identi-
ties.20 Even the widespread imperialist mode of indirect rule e
whereby authority is delegated from the colonial power to a native
ruler e becomes difﬁcult in settings where people are always
equipped to engage in further dispersal and scattering.21Whilst the
Zomia framework has given new impetus to Himalayan scholar-
ship, Shneiderman argues that South Asia's high mountain border
zone should not be seen as a ‘non-state space’. Instead, she speaks
of ‘a “multiple-state space”, comprised of the territory of all of the
nations and states in question, yet transcending the individual
sovereignty of any single state’.22 In order to advance this
perspective I argue that conﬂuent territories and overlapping sov-
ereignties are key to understanding imperial frontiers. Overlapping
sovereignties occur when different actors claim control over the
same sort of thing, for instance trade. Whilst these claims are often
imagined as being inherently territorial, their articulation can also,
and at the same time, be marked by great uncertainty as to who
controls where. Without the presence of deﬁnite boundaries actors
can effectively negotiate their political authority within such
conﬂuent territories through power relationships of allegiance.
Although the onset of European colonialism added a new force to
the negotiations over sovereignty and territoriality others
continued to stake their claims: imperial powers such as China or
Russia as well as independent polities such as Nepal or Tibet.
‘Zomia-thinking’ thus foregrounds the agentive participation of
multiple states in producing and reproducing sovereign power.23
Little consideration, however, has been given to the plural array
of processes that contribute to the sovereign articulations of even
one state.
Based on the assumption that there is no route to a pure and
invariably territorial kind of de jure or legal sovereignty, Agnew
approaches this plural character of sovereignty by distinguishing
four sovereignty regimes. These regimes, which account for a
state's capacity ‘to exercise de facto sovereignty’, are classiﬁed as
classic (an effective central state political authority within a well-
deﬁned territory); imperialist (a weak state authority that is char-
acterized by a high degree of external dependency and a constant
threat to its territoriality); integrative (different tiers of govern-
ment are established within complex territorial arrangements);
and globalist (a strong central state authority that exercises effec-
tive sovereignty beyond its national state territory and enrols other
states into its strategies).24 For Agnew these regimes represent
ideal types. In order to meet their political agendas, states can
employ versions of them simultaneously by relying, for instance, on
some form of classic sovereignty to manage internal affairs and on
globalist sovereignty when dealing with other states and interna-
tional actors. Such a pluralist understanding of sovereignty is
echoed in a number of inﬂuential studies of British India's imperial
history.
As Legg shows in his stimulating examination of the20 Scott, The Art of Not Being Governed, 43e44.
21 For the modalities of indirect rule see T.R. Metcalf, Imperial Connections: India in
the Indian Ocean Arena, 1860e1920, Berkeley, 2007; K. Mantena, Alibis of Empire:
Henry Maine and the Ends of Liberal Imperialism, Princeton, 2010.
22 Shneiderman, Himalayan border citizens, 28.
23 Shneiderman, Himalayan border citizens, 28.
24 J. Agnew, Sovereignty regimes: territoriality and state authority in contempo-
rary world politics, Annals of the Association on American Geographers 95 (2005)
438.entanglements between imperialism and internationalism during
the interwar period, sovereignty in British Indiawas not only highly
adaptive but also shaped by tensions across various scales.25 After
India joined the League of Nations as the only non-self-governing
member in 1919, its new international status exposed several
anomalies with regard to both its external, or imperial, and inter-
nal, or colonial, regime of sovereignty. Such anomalies also feature
prominently in Benton's analysis of empires' legal geographies in
terms of ‘corridors’ and ‘enclaves’.26 Imperial administrators often
had disputes amongst themselves about the nature and limits of
delegated authority. Speciﬁc environments such as oceans and
mountains triggered numerous legal challenges and created juris-
dictional conﬂicts that complicated imperial rule. Resembling
Scott's analysis, Benton also considers lowlanders' depictions of
mountains as uncivilized and unruly regions. But she is less inter-
ested in the political agency of the colonized mountain dwellers
than in the deliberations of imperial jurists who had to specify and
justify the exceptional legal status that these regions often received.
According to Benton, the perceived low level of development in
mountains convinced British ofﬁcials to incorporate them only
partially as ‘quasi-sovereign’ polities.27 Benton's prime example for
quasi-sovereign polities is British India's Princely States, whose
rulers retained some degree of internal legal authority whilst being
severely restricted in their external relations. Non-Regulation
Provinces, such as Kumaon, represent a further but less well
known variation of an administrative unit in which ‘the application
of imperial law routinely required its own suspension’.28
The unevenly layered domains of sovereignty to which Benton
attends largely in terms of jurisdictional politics have been com-
plemented by Ludden's focus on ‘the everyday politics of haggling
and negotiation’ in imperial margins.29 According to his analytical
framework, empire is best understood as a process that operates
through patterns of inequality, is driven by negotiations over
territoriality, and is characterized by an uneven spread and plural
articulation of sovereignty. In order to conceptualize the repro-
duction and transformation of imperial space Ludden adopts two
concepts, fusion and ﬁssion, that have a long tradition in anthro-
pological discussions of politics and kinship amongst segmentary
lineage societies.30 Under fusion, heavy central investments are
deployed to tighten the imperial grid and ensure the replication of
centralized power and authority in the peripheries. Fission, by
contrast, is advanced by frontier activists, such as the commis-
sioners of Non-Regulation Provinces, who are relatively indepen-
dent of central support, command and control. The concepts of
fusion and ﬁssion thus partly represent versions of Agnew's sov-
ereignty regimes, with the former matching the classic and the
latter the imperialist regime. Whilst Ludden points out that these
modes often occur within one and the same imperial project, he26 L. Benton, A Search for Sovereignty: Law and Geography in European Empires
1400e1900, Cambridge, 2010.
27 L. Benton, From international law to imperial constitutions: the problem of
quasi-sovereignty, 1870e1900, Law and History Review 26 (2008) 595e619.
28 M. Ogborn, Review of Lauren Benton, A search for sovereignty: law and geog-
raphy in European empires, 1400e1900, American Historical Review 117 (2012) 815.
For the emergence of quasi-sovereign places beyond the colonial territory of Brit-
ain's Indian empire, see J. Onley, The Raj reconsidered: British India's informal
empire and spheres of inﬂuence in Asia and Africa, Asian Affairs 40 2009 44e62.
29 D. Ludden, The process of empire: frontiers and borderlands, in: P.F. Bang, C.A.
Bayly (Eds), Tributary Empires in Global History, London, 2011, 143.
30 Ludden, The process of empire, 139e140.
35 See R.A. Huttenback, Gulab Singh and the creation of the Dogra state of Jammu,
Kashmir and Ladakh, Journal of Asian Studies 20 (1961) 477e488.
36 R.S. Tolia, Founders of Modern Administration in Uttarakhand, 1815e1884: Edward
Gardner to Henry Ramsey, Dehra Dun, 2009, 99e136.
37 G.T. Lushington to the Lieutenant Governor N.W.P., 26 March 1842, Kumaon
Division, Political Letters Issued, Volume 50. State Archive Uttar Pradesh, Lucknow,
C. Bergmann / Journal of Historical Geography 51 (2016) 88e9892also highlights that fusion was more prevalent in imperial China
whilst Indian empires, including Britain's Indian Empire, remained
by and large ﬁssiparous.31
In ﬁssiparous empire, elites at higher echelons remain satisﬁed
if the loyalty of local elites in peripheries is secure. Whilst there is
always the danger of rebellion and breakaway territories, ﬁssion
keeps the empire highly ﬂexible and adaptive to changing cir-
cumstances. Due to a relatively low level of central investment, the
external frontiers of ﬁssiparous imperial expansion are character-
ized bywhat Ludden calls ‘frontier penury’: wealth, tax and tributes
move from peripheries toward the centre, whilst honour and
privilege move from the centre toward the margins.32 Those who
are commissioned to govern such penurious frontiers must there-
fore generally work with what and whom they ﬁnd on the ground,
which is to a large degree dependent on the activities of preceding
regimes. In other words, ‘[o]ld imperial frontiers… move across
boundaries of time, creating borderlands among overlapping re-
gimes’ that are shaped by plural and often also conﬂicting sover-
eign claims.33 It is such multiple claims that are analyzed in what
follows by using the example of Kumaon. I ﬁrst look at the estab-
lishment of this region as a Non-Regulation Province by attending
to the strategies of British administrators in gaining the loyalty of
its trans-Himalayan traders, particularly after the Dogras' invasion
of western Tibet in 1841. Subsequently, I turn to the negotiations
between colonial administrators, Tibetan authorities and the Bho-
tiyas over taxation, which dramatize British efforts to mould this
ﬁssiparous frontier into the empire's standard grid during the
1890s.
Securing traders' loyalty in a Non-Regulation Province
When the British conquered Kumaon in 1815, the Bhotiyas' trade
was limited to the barter of locally needed products, such as grain,
salt, cloth and wool. Ladakhi traders monopolized the long distance
trade in pashminawool used for the weaving of ﬁne textiles such as
shawls. A primary aim of the British administration in Kumaonwas
to divert this lucrative trade from Tibet directly into British terri-
tory.34 Kumaon's status as a Non-Regulation Province gave the
British the ﬂexibility to accomplish this. Its powerful commis-
sioners usually remained in ofﬁce for long periods so that their
decision making would adapt optimally to local conditions.
Assisting these commissioners were locally recruited patwaris,
revenue ofﬁcers who had a reach to the remote and inaccessible
imperial margins. Inﬂuential Bhotiya traders were identiﬁed as
perfect candidates for this ofﬁce, as theywerewell connected to the
resource rich Tibetan plateau. The British relied on them as political
‘ambassadors’ and a bridge to the Tibetan authorities.
This strategy became more clearly apparent when the Dogras, a
ruling dynasty from Jammu that was tributary to the Sikh kingdom,
invaded western Tibet under the leadership of General Zorawar
Singh in 1841 (see Fig. 2). Due to this conﬂict the trans-Himalayan
trade was severely affected, and the Bhotiya ‘ambassadors’ were
supported so that they could further British ambitions and deliver
intelligence. At that time the Company was already at war with
China (First Opium War, 1839e1842) and Afghanistan (Auckland's
Folly, 1839e1842). It was feared that the Sikhs would use the31 Ludden, The process of empire, 146e147.
32 Ludden, The process of empire, 138e139. For the importance of documents,
especially letters, that were moving within imperial space see M. Ogborn, Indian
Ink: Script and Print in the Making of the English East India Company, Chicago, 2007.
33 Ludden, The process of empire, 138.
34 J. Rizvi, The trade in pashm and its impact on Ladakh's history, in: M. van Beek,
K.B. Bertelsen, P. Pedersen (Eds), Ladakh: Culture, History and Development between
Himalaya and Karakoram, Aarhus, 1999, 317e338.Dogras' encroachment on the plateau to foster an alliance with the
Nepalese and thus endanger British colonial rule in Kumaon.35 It is
thus hardly surprising that the then commissioner of Kumaon e
G.T. Lushingtone played a major role in handling the extended role
for the Bhotiyas. What is striking, however, is that scholars have
consistently ignored his substantial inﬂuence on later de-
velopments.36 Lushington respected the claims and interests of
resident communities, especially of the Bhotiyas, and in return
expected their allegiance in safeguarding the interests of British
investors. When several of the Tibetanmarts visited by the Bhotiyas
were closed due to the Dogras' military action in 1841, Lushington
quickly contrived a strategy that would serve both the Company's
and the affected British subjects' requirements:
It appears to me that these somewhat savage yet well disposed
subjects of our government are in every point of view entitled to
the above amount of indulgence [referring to a remission of
revenues in the Bhotiya valleys] e if not more. … It is not
however on ﬁscal as on political grounds that I think these re-
missions should be made. These people inhabit and occupy the
tracts in which the passes into Kumaon from Thibit [sic] are
situated. It is therefore of the highest importance that the good
feeling, which now exists on their part towards our Government
should be strengthened and served. In another point of view too,
I think these remissions will be politically advantageous. The
fact of their having been allowed will be soon communicated by
our traders to the Taklakote [Taklakot, a trade mart in western
Tibet, see Fig. 2] authorities and tend more than any other
measure I know of to convince the latter that the Sikh invasion
of their country was neither instigated nor countenanced by our
Government.37
The Bhotiyas, as ‘somewhat savage yet well-disposed subjects’
of the British government, were meant to be relieved e at least
temporarily e from paying further revenues.38 On the one hand,
such a measure was thought to facilitate a free trade that the
Company was eager to achieve.39 On the other hand, a generous
ﬁscal policy was aimed at nurturing the Bhotiyas' ‘good feeling’
toward the British government. Underpinned by a ﬁrm foundation
of political loyalty, it was expected that local traders would
communicate the beneﬁts of British rule to the authorities in
western Tibet with a minimum of assistance or ﬁnancial burden.
Only a few months later the situation had apparently improved.
Lushington, however, remained uncertain about whether his
strategy had really paid off or if the situation had eased for entirely
different reasons. Based on reports he received from a Bhotiya
patwari who had returned from the trade marts in western Tibet,
the situation was assessed as follows:India [hereafter SAUP].
38 Since the onset of their rule in Kumaon the British levied relatively low taxes on
the Bhotiyas e both in comparison to other groups in the region and to the sums
collected by the former ruling powers. See G.W. Traill, Statistical report on the
Bhotiya Mehals of Kumaon [1832], in: M.P. Joshi, A.C. Fanger, C.W. Brown (Eds),
Himalaya: Past and Present, Vol. II, Almora, 1992, 99e154; J.H. Batten, Final report on
the settlement of Kumaon, 1848, in: J.H. Batten (Ed), Ofﬁcial Reports on the Province
of Kumaon with a Medical Report on the Mahamurree in Gurhwal, in 1849e1850, Agra,
1851, 258e356.
39 See C.W. Brown, The Goat is Mine, the Load is Yours: Morphogenesis of ‘Bhotiya-
Shauka’, U.P., India, Lund, 1984, 90.
Fig. 2. Kumaon's location within the power constellations of 1819.
42 The main motive behind the invasion of the independent kingdom of Ladakh by
Gulab Singh in 1834 was a monopolistic ambition for the shawl-wool trade.
However, the invasion had the unintended consequence of diverting the main
commercial route of this commodity toward Rampur, which is located within to-
day's Indian state of Himachal Pradesh. This development encouraged Gulab Singh
‘to carry his conquests a stage further and invade the shawl-wool producing areas
C. Bergmann / Journal of Historical Geography 51 (2016) 88e98 93It appears that the Lhassa [sic] authorities entertain none but
friendly feelings towards the British Government and its sub-
jects [the Bhotiyas] and in proof of this (supposed) friendly
disposition, the re-establishment of the trade between our
Bhotiyas and their subjects on the old footing is adduced by our
informants. Perhaps the peaceable reestablishment of the trade
proceedsmore from the conviction of its absolute necessity than
from any especial feelings of friendship, for it surely cannot be
supposed that the Lhassa authorities are ignorant of our rupture
with China….40
‘Feelings of friendship’ may indeed have hardly played any role.
The armed conﬂict had led to a shortage of grains in western Tibet
and the need for supplies encouraged a swift resumption of trade
‘on the old footing’, at least in respect of some of the merchandise
transported by the Bhotiyas.41 But things had not really settled
down yet, as subsequent reports from the patwaris attested. The
armed conﬂict not only boiled up again but also impinged on an40 G.T. Lushington to R.N.C. Hamilton, 16 August 1842, Kumaon Division, Political
Letters Issued, Volume 50, SAUP.
41 M.P. Joshi and C.W. Brown, Some dynamics of Indo-Tibetan trade through
Uttarakhanda (Kumaon-Garhwal), India, Journal of the Economic and Social History
of the Orient 30 (1987) 315.item that was of high value and of particular interest to British
investors, namely shawl-wool.42 Although the main commercial
route for this item then ran through non-British territories in the
western Himalaya, with Rampur as its chief mart, it also assumed
increasing signiﬁcance in Kumaon.43
In the summer of 1842, Lushington sent the patwari from Byans
valley on a reconnaissance mission to western Tibet. The patwari
conﬁrmed that the Dogras were reinforcing a traditional prohibi-
tion on the sale of shawl-wool to any but Ladakhi traders.44 The
commissioner seemed, however, less surprised about the stoppage
of trade than about the gross proﬁts that the Bhotiyas wereof Western Tibet’. See A. Lamb, Tibet in Anglo-Chinese relations: 1767e1842, Journal
of the Royal Asiatic Society of Great Britain and Ireland 1e2 (1958) 40; see also Rizvi,
The trade in pashm, 317e338.
43 For a brief account of the development of trade in Rampur see S. Vasan, Indo-
Tibetan border trade in Himachal Pradesh, China Report 42 (2006) 41e56.
44 Translation of a Report from the Putwary of Bians, 28 August 1842, Forwarded
on 14 September from G.T. Lushington to Lieutenant Governor N.W.P., Kumaon
Division, Political Letters Issued, Volume 50, SAUP.
51 The Dogras' main military leader, General Zorawar Singh, was killed in a battle
near Taklakot in December 1841. His fellow campaigner, Colonel Basti Ram,
continued ﬁghting in that locality until January 1842. See S.S. Charak, Extracts from
C. Bergmann / Journal of Historical Geography 51 (2016) 88e9894reportedly able to pocket. In the margins of the original letter he
calculated that the proﬁt from one maund of wool was as high as
97%.45 However, later it became clear that the expected economic
losses for the British were of minor signiﬁcance in comparison to
the potential political damages. It was feared that the Dogras might
gradually restrict the trade in other important commodities, such
as borax and salt, which had the potential to weaken the British
position in the trans-Himalayan trade circuit.46
Lushington understood the danger of the Company's loss of
inﬂuence to these native rulers. He thus urged his superiors to
demand an ofﬁcial explanation from the Jammu raja as to why
trade restrictions were being imposed on British subjects. This
demand, however, was unnecessary as the commissioner later
received information that a combined Tibetan-Chinese army had
pushed the Dogra forces back toward Leh (the Ladakhi capital
which they had occupied since 1834). J.D. Cunningham, a British
observer in this area, urged Lushington to continue safeguarding
British interests in the Bhotiya valleys.47 His prompt was geared
particularly toward the well-known fact that Tibetan authorities
collected dues, including land tax, from traders within British ter-
ritory. But Lushington, intimately acquainted as he was with local
practices and market conditions, rejected the advice to intervene.
He understood that such a measure would weaken the Bhotiyas'
trading position. In a letter to Cunningham he justiﬁed this
position:
I do not consider the present a favourable moment for mooting
the point… [since it] would be far better to allow things to
remain as they are now, and indeed have been since the
establishment of our rule in Kumaon. Nor am I without doubts
as to the expediency of hereafter pressing this point on the
Lahssa [sic] authorities who have up to the present time shown
no disposition to molest our traders and who cannot be ex-
pected to renounce a long established privilege without a
struggle to maintain it, or at least without having their fears or
enmity excited by a demand of this kind.48
The commissioner, instead, preferred to sway Bhotiyas' loyalty
toward the British through the maintenance of the tax concessions,
which was also meant to deliver a subtle message to the Tibetans
on the beneﬁts of British rule. By strengthening the Bhotiyas trade
on its ‘old footing’, i.e. as a measure of convenience rather than
strict state control, the commissioner intended to activate a polit-
ical dialogue with the Tibetans without risking any ‘loss of dignity’,
should subsequent developments fail.49 He even cherished the
hope that this dialogue would eventually disrupt the prevailing
Tibetan ‘system of exclusiveness as regards foreign nations’.50 In
other words, the Bhotiyas enjoyed the privilege of low taxes whilst
having the freedom to follow custom in their interactions with
Tibetan traders and state authorities. This policy would remain the45 Translation of a Report, 28 August 1842, SAUP. For the Bhotiyas' proﬁt margins
see also Mittal, British Administration, 216e228. Maund is the anglicized name of a
traditional mass unit in South Asia. The British set one maund equal to 100 English
troy pounds (37.32 kg).
46 G.T. Lushington to R.N.C. Hamilton, 14 September 1842, Kumaon Division, Po-
litical Letters Issued, Volume 50, SAUP.
47 G.T. Lushington to R.N.C. Hamilton, 17 September 1842, Kumaon Division, Po-
litical Letters Issued, Volume 50, SAUP.
48 Lushington to Hamilton, 17 September 1842, SAUP.
49 Lushington to Hamilton, 17 September 1842, SAUP.
50 G.T. Lushington to the Secretary of Government N.W.P., Secret Department, 9
February 1842, Kumaon Division, Political Letters Issued, Volume 50, SAUP. The
reason for Tibet's closed-door policy can be traced back to a decision made in 1792.
At that time the Gorkhas had advanced into Tibet and the British refused to assist
the Lhasa authorities. See Anand, Strategic hypocrisy, 232.status quo for over ﬁve decades. For the time being, however, the
political crisis was not yet fully overcome.
While the Dogras' penetration into western Tibet raised fears
amongst the British of a rapprochement between the Sikh and
Nepali kings, the subsequent Tibetan recapture of their occupied
land brought forth other strategic concerns.51 British ofﬁcials then
regarded as likely that the Tibetan and Chinese authorities would
attribute the whole matter to the instigation of the British East
India Company. Such an assumption could indeed have been sug-
gested by the fact that the beaten Sikh and Dogra soldiers received,
as a matter of both ‘policy and humanity’, protection in Kumaon.52
Many soldiers escaped into British territory across the Lipu Lekh
pass that leads into the Byans valley (see Fig. 2). The Bhotiya patwari
of that valley was instructed to arrange for the soldiers' safe onward
journey to the British executive headquarters in Almora, where
they received medical treatment.
In order to avoid a direct confrontation with the Tibetans near
Kumaon, which Lushington anticipated would result in a complete
standstill of trade, serious thought was given by the British to the
idea of providing military support to the Dogras in the more distant
Ladakh.53 In the end, however, the British did nothing but wait
because the two parties continued to battle for supremacy in that
locale.54 On the 17th September 1842, the Tibetans accepted a
peace agreement with the Dogras.55 The Dogras remained in con-
trol of Ladakh and traders on both sides continued business in
accordance with former custom. In Kumaon, a favourable vantage
point for the ﬂourishing trans-Himalayan trade e particularly in
shawl-woolewas established in 1843. In that year Gulab Singh, the
ruler of Jammu, formally expressed his gratitude to Lushington ‘for
the attention shown at his place in the year 1841/42 to his sick and
wounded soldiers from Taklakote [sic]’.56 Three years later, and
after the British had won a war against the Sikh kingdom, Gulab
Singh and the British government were formally allied by the
Treaty of Amritsar. Soon after, the Ladakhi monopoly over the
shawl-wool trade was ﬁnally and ofﬁcially dissolved. A rapid in-
crease in the volume of trade, particularly for wool, emerged during
the second half of the nineteenth century (see Table 1).57 The wool
trade through the high valleys of Kumaon increased from approx-
imately 800 kg in 1841 to more than 330,000 kg by 1901.58
Industrialized wool mills in fast-growing market towns along the
Himalayan foothills fuelled this growth in demand.59 Initially the
Bhotiyas sold their goods mostly through middlemen in the Lesser
Himalaya. However, they later began to bargain directly with‘General Zorowar Singh’, in: A. McKay (Ed), The History of Tibet, Volume II: The
Medieval Period: c.850e1895. The Development of Buddhist Paramountcy, London,
2003 [1983], 763.
52 G.T. Lushington to R.N.C. Hamilton, 27 April 1842, Kumaon Division, Political
Letters Issued, Volume 50, SAUP.
53 See Lamb, Anglo-Chinese relations, 41.
54 G.T. Lushington to R.N.C. Hamilton, 24 October 1842, Kumaon Division, Political
Letters Issued, Volume 50, SAUP.
55 See K. Warikoo, Ladakh's trade relations with Tibet under the Dogras, China
Report 26 (1990) 138.
56 G.T. Lushington to R.N.C. Hamilton, 30 August 1843, Kumaon Division, Political
Letters Issued, Volume 50, SAUP.
57 See Huttenback, Gulab Singh, 488.
58 J.E. Goudge, Almora: Final Report on the Assessment of the Almora District and the
Hill Pattis of the Naini Tal District, 1903, V/27/314/643, India Ofﬁce Library and Re-
cords at the Asia and Africa Collection of the British Library, London [hereafter IOL].
59 T. Roy, Changes in wool production and usage in colonial India, Modern Asian
Studies 37 (2003) 271e272.
Table 1
Import of wool, borax and salt from Tibet to Kumaon in the nineteenth century
(measuring unit maund, where one maund equals 37.32 kg).
Gori valley Darma & Byans valley Total
1840
Wool 15 7 22
Borax 9,000 8,000 17,000
Salt 2,000 3,000 5,000
1877e1878
(annual average over 2 yrs)
Wool 4,325 479 4,804
Borax 10,061 10,335 20,396
Salt 5,177 8,266 13,443
1898e1901
(annual average over 4 yrs)
Wool 2,388 6,479 8,867
Borax 6,808 14,687 21,595
Salt 5,510 13,855 19,365
Sources: Annual Report on Foreign Trade of the United Provinces, 1878, V/24/4163,
IOL; J.E. Goudge, Almora: Final Report on the Assessment of the Almora District and the
Hill Pattis of the Naini Tal District, 1903, V/27/314/643, IOL.
63 Deputy Collector of Almora, 15 October 1896, RAU, 33.
64 P. Whalley, British Kumaon: The Law of the Extra-Regulation Tracts Subordinate to
the Government, N.W.P., Varanasi, 1991 [1870].
65 Benton, From international law, 612.
66 See Mittal, British Administration, 85e86; Tolia, Founders of Modern Adminis-
tration, 285e287.
67 Deputy Collector of Almora, 15 October 1896, RAU, 34.
68 Lieutenant C.E. Bliss to the Deputy Assistant Adjutant-General Rohilkund Dis-
trict, 16 November 1894, Political Department N.W.P. and Oudh, Proceedings for
January 1895, No. 10, RAU, 25.
69 From the Commissioner, Kumaun Division, Submitting Certain Reports
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The Bhotiyas' trade expanded rapidly once the Dogras' military
campaign in western Tibet ended. With a reduction in the
perceived risk of foreign invasion via the Tibetan plateau, the
strategic importance of their mountain passes waned, at least for
the time being. British administrators then considered it neither
necessary to protect Kumaon's northern boundary nor to intervene
toomuch in local affairs. As a result, the Bhotiyas had little towhich
they could object, especially since their (tax) privileges and relative
autonomy in handling trade-related affairs remained by and large
unchanged. In the interest of ongoing trade the Bhotiyas were
encouraged tomaintain and strengthen their ties with the Tibetans,
whilst direct British access to the plateau remained strictly
prohibited.
In summary, it can be said that the British capitalized on
Kumaon's exceptional legal status as a Non-Regulation Province to
secure the Bhotiyas' loyalty and thereby strengthen the empire's
position within the trans-Himalayan commercial circuit. They
achieved this objective through tax concessions and non-
interference in the traditional trade arrangements. In implement-
ing thesemeasures, however, British administrators accepted limits
to imperial sovereignty in favour of other interests, namely of
channelling economically signiﬁcant trade products, especially
shawl-wool, from Tibet to British territory. Even in the earliest
periods of British rule in Kumaon, G.W. Traill, the second
commissioner of Kumaon, had already discerned that the Bhotiyas
remained in ‘an anomalous state of subjection [to Tibetan rule]
which their paramount interests in continuing to be the medium of
commercial intercourse… will tend to perpetuate’.61 The fact that
the Bhotiyas continued paying taxes on land to Tibetan authorities
even gained tacit approval under British rule. As this section has
shown, G.T. Lushington had taken a stand for the retention of this
practice in handling the region's complex milieu of conﬂicting in-
terests and alliances during the 1840s. About thirty years later of-
ﬁcials simply reworded the Tibetan land tax as a trade levy so as not
to disturb the ﬂow of commerce.62 In practice, everything60 H.G. Walton, Almora: A Gazetteer (District Gazetteers of the United Provinces of
Agra and Oudh, Vol. XXXV), Allahabad, 1911, 69.
61 G.W. Traill quoted in Walton, Almora, 149.
62 Deputy Collector of Almora to Deputy Commissioner of Almora, Mr. Larkin's
Report on the Subject of the Dues Levied by the Thibetans from British Subjects, 15
October 1896, Political Department of the N.W.P. and Oudh, Proceedings for August
1897, No. 28, Regional Archive Uttarakhand, Nainital, India [hereafter RAU], 27.continued pretty much as before, not least since British ofﬁcers
remained virtually absent from these valleys.63 The conﬂuent ter-
ritories and overlapping sovereignties towhich these arrangements
point were only questioned toward the end of the nineteenth
century, a time when British administrators aimed to bring this
external frontier of ﬁssiparous imperial expansion under the col-
ony's standard grid.
Claiming territorial sovereignty and negotiating for the
formal rule of law
As a Non-Regulation Province, Kumaon's legal status had remained
rather obscure. For this reason the colonial government dispatched
a judicial ofﬁcial, P. Whalley, to gather detailed information on the
laws and regulations that were in force in 1869.64 Thereafter,
Kumaonwas included within the Scheduled District Act, which was
passed in 1874. This act ‘listed those districts that would be
exempted from legislation applicable to the rest of [British] Indian
territory’.65 As a result the Kumaon commissioner had some of his
powers restricted, whilst new regulations and acts were extended
or declared in force in the region.66 The high valleys inhabited by
the Bhotiyas, however, remained largely unaffected by these
developments.
This situation was set to change when a high-ranking British
military ofﬁcer, major general G.N. Channer, went on a hunting trip
through the upper Byans valley in 1884. He personally witnessed
how British subjects, the Bhotiyas, paid taxes on British land to the
Tibetan authorities.67 Channer and other military men repeatedly
urged the Kumaon administration to once and for all prevent ‘the
malpractices of the Thibetan [sic] Jongpen [governor]’.68 In conse-
quence, the then commissioner of Kumaon raised the issue of the
absurdity of leaving unaddressed a ‘bantam power [that] virtually
claims sovereignty’ over British subjects.69 The whole incident
touched a raw nerve and triggered a knee-jerk quest for what
Ranajit Guha calls ‘strategies of improvement’: government initia-
tives that would give adequate attention to both the security of
these frontier regions and the activities of their resident commu-
nities.70 It was regarded as particularly important to tie the Bho-
tiyas more formally to the colonial state by urging them ‘to
recognise British authority’ and to ‘realize their position as British
subjects’.71
The colonial government had so far interfered in the local affairs
of the Bhotiyas only to ensure that trade would continue on its ‘old
footing’. But it turned out that this fairly lax policy had created its
own frictions. Both British and Tibetan state ofﬁcials staked theirReceived from the Deputy Commissioner of Almora on the Subject of Dues Realized
by the Thibetans from British Subjects in Pattis Byans, Chaudans, and Malla Darma,
12 November 1896, Political Department N.W.P. and Oudh, Proceedings for August
1897, No. 26a, RAU, 20.
70 R. Guha, Dominance without hegemony and its historiography, in: R. Guha (Ed),
Subaltern Studies: Writings on South Asian History and Society, Vol. 6, Delhi, 1989,
210e309.
71 Deputy Commissioner of Almora to Commissioner of the Kumaon Division, n.d.,
Political Department N.W.P. and Oudh, Proceedings for October 1895, No. 16, RAU,
27.
79 Deputy Collector of Almora, 15 October 1896, RAU, 34. For the cartographic
exploration of British India see I.J. Barrow, Making History, Drawing Territory: British
C. Bergmann / Journal of Historical Geography 51 (2016) 88e9896claims over the ﬂourishing trans-Himalayan trade. Whilst the
British had been aware of these overlapping sovereign claims for
decades, they had continued to imagine their political authority as
being deﬁned territorially. However, it gradually transpired that
there existed a great uncertainty as to who was in control where.
Without the presence of clearly demarcated and secured bound-
aries the Tibetans effectively wielded inﬂuence within these
conﬂuent territories through power relationships of allegiance.
These relationships were reﬂected, for instance, in the taxation
scheme that the jongpen applied in the Bhotiya valleys. In order to
ensure that British sovereignty and territoriality become congruent
a scheme ‘for placing the administration of that tract [the valleys
inhabited by the Bhotiyas] on a proper footing’ was thus felt to be
required.72 A general problem was that colonial ofﬁcers had
become ‘out of touch’ with local frontier people.73 Since Lush-
ington's death in 1848 their only information about what was
happening in the high valleys was from the patwaris, inﬂuential
Bhotiyas who held their ofﬁce by right of heredity.While all of them
had a good name and reputation, they were largely independent of
government instruction and control, a circumstance that became
seen as highly problematic.
As an initial step the new ofﬁce of the political peshkar, a civil
servant with police powers, was temporarily established in October
1895.74 Kharak Singh Pal was appointed because of his social
standing and political inﬂuence, and because of his competence in a
variety of local languages.75 He was a close relative of the Rajwar of
Askot, the pre-colonial ruler of the region whom the British
simultaneously installed as an honorary munsif or native judge.76
Besides acquiring information, the peshkar was assigned to
counter inappropriate Tibetan demands on and dealings with
British subjects. Although hewas considered to be doing a good job,
the need for European presence and active involvement was soon
thought indispensable for handling the situation ‘in an authorita-
tive way’.77 For that reason, in summer 1896 the deputy collector
from Almora, J. Larkin, was dispatched to inspect the region and
consult with the jongpen of Taklakot, the major political player on
the Tibetan side. He returned with the following account of the
local atmosphere:
I think I may appropriately mention my own experience as
illustrative of the bearing of the people [the Bhotiya traders] to
the English ofﬁcial and towards the Jongpen. When the latter
individual approached my camp…, the Bhutias [sic] to a man
desertedmy camp and hastened tomeet the Thibetan [sic]. They
received him, erected his tents, attended to his wants and
comforts as well as to those of his large following, their horses
and cattle, all gratuitously. During the two days that our camps
lay side by side, the Bhutias were conspicuous by their absence
from my camp. This and other signs showed me that while our
Bhutia subjects were cringingly servile to the Thibetan, they
were coolly indifferent to the English ofﬁcial. All this is no doubt
due to our supineness in the past as compared with the rigorous72 Letter to the Commissioner, Kumaon Division, Communicating Order on Serial
No. 40, and Sanctioning the Entertainment of an Establishment Costing Rs. 942 a
Year for One Year from 1st October 1895, 11 October 1895, Political Department
N.W.P. and Oudh, Proceedings for October 1895, No. 17, RAU, 31.
73 Deputy Collector of Almora, 15 October 1896, RAU, 34.
74 Letter to the Commissioner, 11 October 1895, RAU.
75 Deputy Collector of Almora, 15 October 1896, RAU, 34.
76 Letter to the Commissioner, 11 October 1895, RAU, 32.
77 Deputy Commissioner, Almora, to Commissioner, Kumaon Division, 29 October
1896, Political Department N.W.P. and Oudh, Proceedings for August 1897, No. 27,
RAU, 26.
78 Deputy Collector of Almora, 15 October 1896, RAU, 34.rule of Thibet. If our District Ofﬁcers had visited those parts and
looked into the matters these things would be different.78
In his view the Tibetans had obviously remained the ‘masters of
the situation’, whereas British rule existed only ‘on paper’, espe-
cially on maps.79 The former good feeling of the Bhotiyas toward
the colonial government was then depicted as being disrupted
‘through fear’ of the jongpen's coercive measures.80 Worse still, the
latter apparently not only claimed ﬁscal-cum-territorial authority
but also judicial authority over the Bhotiyas. It was reported that
the traders, whether for convenience or by constraint, did not take
their grievances and disputes to the British headquarters in Almora
e a 250 km journey e but ‘to Taklakot, a march beyond our border,
where they are in the midst of their own kinsmen at the seat of
their trade’.81 While all these everyday arrangements appeared as
grit in the gears of the imperial machinery, and provoked numerous
recommendations for improvement, most efforts were directed
toward solving the highly controversial issue of land revenue.
All along the jongpen articulatedhis claim to sovereignty in avery
straightforwardmanner: ‘It is customary with us to realize tax from
Darma in the samewayaswedo fromByans.Wewill go on doing so:
we cannot leave our “kadimi dastur” [ancient custom]’.82 To Larkin
he further emphasized that a British ofﬁcer, namely J. O'Beckett, had
even personally sanctioned him to do so.83 When the deputy col-
lector came to inform the jongpen of the British government's legal
prohibition on the collection of any land revenue by a foreign au-
thority, he met with a recalcitrant opponent who took a lot of
persuading to give a written acknowledgement of this new order.
Under the threat of arrest the jongpen put his signature ‘on the
smallest scrap of paper possible’, temporarily refrained from col-
lectinghis dues and then ‘arranged to refer thematter to Lhassa [sic],
though he puerilely urged that it meant his recall and disgrace’.84
The Bhotiyas were alarmed by all this and expected the Tibetans
to respond with hard-hitting measures. Inﬂuential traders had
already sided with the jongpen, claiming that the disputed revenue
system was also part of their kadimi dastur, or ancient custom, and
that its dissolution would make them suffer irrevocable losses.85 In
fear of exclusion from the commercial circuit with Tibet the traders
even refused to take any advances from representatives of the
woollen mills in the plains.86 In other words, as the struggle for
territorial sovereignty gradually gained momentum the forecasts
looked damaging rather than beneﬁcial from the British perspective.
Moreover, chanceswerehigh that local residentswould attribute any
adverse effects to the interference by the colonial government. As a
way out of these difﬁculties, in early summer 1897 the deputy
commissioner of Almora proposed two principles for the develop-
ment of a sound policy, which he called the ‘imperial’ and the
‘mercantile’:87Mapping in India, c. 1756e1905, New Delhi, 2003.
80 Translation of Kharak Singh's Report, 28 July 1896, Political Department N.W.P.
and Oudh, Proceedings for August 1897, No. 26[h], RAU, 24.
81 Deputy Collector of Almora, 15 October 1896, RAU, 34.
82 Translation of Jongpen's Statement, 19 August 1896, Political Department N.W.P.
and Oudh, Proceedings for August 1897, No. 26[m], RAU, 25.
83 Deputy Collector of Almora, 15 October 1896, RAU, 32.
84 Deputy Collector of Almora, 15 October 1896, RAU, 32.
85 Translation of Pashkar Karakh Singh's Report, 26 December 1895, Political
Department N.W.P. and Oudh, Proceedings for August 1897, No. 26[c], RAU, 21e22.
86 Deputy Commissioner, Almora, to Commissioner, Kumaon Division, 25 June 1897,
Political Department N.W.P. and Oudh, Proceedings for August 1897, No. 32, RAU, 44.
87 The early British Empire can be conceived as a mercantile project that was
geared toward the expansion of commercial monopolies. After 1858 the acquisition
of new territory became increasingly legitimized through the imperial objective of
civilizing primitive places and peoples.
C. Bergmann / Journal of Historical Geography 51 (2016) 88e98 97From the ﬁrst point the payment of any land tax, whether
separate or composite, to a foreign power by British subjects for
British land is too objectionable to be allowed to continue. On
the other hand, from the second point of view, it becomes a
question of importance whether the discontinuance of the dues
will not play havoc with our trade with Thibet [sic] and subject
our traders to much hardship once they cross the borders.… If
Thibet were a civilized power, the issues would be much
simpliﬁed. Unfortunately it is a barbaric power, and the frontier
ofﬁcials with whomwe have to treat are uncouth, ignorant, and
grasping barbarians.88
Based on the assumption that neither the Bhotiyas nor the Ti-
betans had any clear idea about the distinction ‘between a land and
a trade revenue’, the deputy commissioner issued a new order that
was aligned to amore centralizedmode of imperial management.89
This order, which could have enforced the empire's claim to terri-
torial sovereignty, sustained a ban on the collection of any foreign
dues within British territory but allowed the Bhotiyas to pay
whatever they liked in Tibet itself. Since the Tibetans could still
elicit any foregone taxes on their side of the border, the continua-
tion of commerce was considered likely. Even more importantly, it
was expected that this policy would prevent the ‘semi-indepen-
dent’ and ‘ill-controlled’ frontier ofﬁcials of the Lhasa government
from undermining ‘British prestige’.90 However, observers antici-
pated that the new order would, at least initially, require
‘enforcement at the point of the bayonet’.91
Only a few weeks after this order had been issued, the Tibetan
authorities closed the Lipu Lekh without further ado and pushed
trade via a neighboring pass in far-western Nepal.92 The peshkar
reported that neither the jongpen nor the Bhotiyas were reconciled
with the idea of resolving tax-related activities solely in Tibet.93 The
most obvious reason e although poorly understood by British ofﬁ-
cials in Kumaonewas the fact that the revenue collectionwas partly
realized as what Polanyi called an ‘administered trade’: ritualized
transactions through government-controlled channels.94 Before the
Bhotiyas were allowed to cross the high passes theywere obliged to
exchange local grains and liquor for salt and borax that Tibetan
nomads brought into their valleys. Whilst the jongpen might have
ﬁxed the exchange rates to the traders' disadvantage when
compared to the going market prices, the system facilitated the
overall logistic, economic and political feasibility of cross-border
commerce: the risk of transportation was distributed among resi-
dents on both sides of the high passes, the overall trade volumewas
enhanced, and all parties e except for the British e secured a
competitive advantage. The Tibetan ofﬁcials maintained their
political-cum-ﬁscal authority and the traders their longstanding
monopoly over the trans-Himalayan goods trafﬁc in Kumaon.9588 Deputy Commissioner, 25 June 1897, RAU, 44.
89 Deputy Commissioner, 25 June 1897, RAU, 44.
90 Deputy Commissioner, 25 June 1897, RAU, 45.
91 Deputy Commissioner, 25 June 1897, RAU, 45.
92 Translation of a Report from Peshkar Kharak Singh Pal, 29 June 1897, Political
Department N.W.P. and Oudh, Proceedings for August 1897, No. 34, RAU, 46.
93 Translation of a Report, 29 June 1897, RAU, 46.
94 K. Polanyi, The economy as instituted process, in: K. Polanyi, C.M. Arensberg,
H.W. Pearson (Eds), Trade and Market in the Early Empires: Economies in History and
Theory, Chicago, 1957, 262. The ritualization of trade in Kumaon included the
ceremonial opening of the annual trading season by Tibetan ofﬁcials (called sarji)
and the exchange of gifts between exclusive trade partners (called mitra). These
ritualized activities formed part of the strategies through which Tibetan authorities
articulated their political authority. See Brown, The Goat is Mine, the Load is Yours,
82e89.
95 See Brown, The Goat is Mine, the Load is Yours, 108e113.The jongpen therefore simply encouraged the Bhotiyas to pay
their dues in neighbouring settlements in Nepal or at largely un-
controlled high pastures and encamping grounds in their own
valleys. Traders welcomed these opportunities since it allowed
them to continue visiting the trade marts on the Tibetan plateau.96
Moreover, Tibetan ofﬁcials informed the peshkar that those traders
who did not pay their dues would later have to pay two or three
times as much.97 In other words, the jongpen did not ‘consider the
least about concession and civility for the British Government’, but
instead thought ‘himself very powerful’.98 And, indeed, he retained
his share. The lieutenant governor of the North-Western Provinces
rejected the use of military force and instead put forward another
proposal with which both the Tibetan authorities and the Bhotiyas
were happy to comply. This provided for themaintenance of the old
Tibetan system, the collection of dues on British territory, with the
exception of it being ofﬁcially redeﬁned as not including land
revenue and as supervised by the political peshkar.99 Subsequently
trade not only resumed but also ﬂourished, as demonstrated by a
near doubling of imported wool between 1897 and 1900 (see
Table 1).100 While the outcome was thus clearly successful for the
colonial economy, the question remains as to its implications in
terms of sovereignty and the application of imperial law.
The issue of conﬂuent territories was reconciled, at least from a
British point of view, by enforcing a strict separation between land
taxes and trade duties. However, this solution also required the
British to accommodate themselves to overlapping sovereignties.
On the one hand they ofﬁcially permitted the Tibetan jongpen to
continue exerting his inﬂuence on the Bhotiyas' commerce by
collecting trade duties on British territory. On the other hand, and
as a preventive measure against any unauthorized Tibetan claim
over the empire's territory, the colonial government also
strengthened the power of other political actors. At the outset of
the dispute British military men had proposed a reinforcement of
the empire's sovereign claim over the Kumaon Himalaya through
the posting of ‘a strong ofﬁcial from some other district’ in the
Bhotiya valleys.101 That Kharak Singh Pal, a representative of
Kumaon's powerful aristocracy, was chosen for this duty was
perhaps a far more effective strategic move. With the simultaneous
nomination of the Rajwar of Askot as a native judge, the British
ensured for the ﬁrst time since their arrival in Kumaon that both the
executive and judicial branches of the empire's civil service were
permanently present and within easy reach of the Bhotiyas. As well
respected local ﬁgures these two men were in a position to grad-
ually enforce imperial law and thus alter the Bhotiyas' cool indif-
ference to British ofﬁcialdom. An initial step in this direction was
accomplished by granting these new imperial ofﬁcials the right to
impose and collect a ‘rent’ of four annas for each house inhabited by
the Bhotiyas from the Darma and Byans valleys during the winter
season.102 In other words, whilst the Bhotiyas still maintained their
trade monopoly they had lost their privileged status as political96 Government of India, Foreign Department, Communicating Remarks on the
Subject of Dues Levied or Claimed by Thibetans from the Bhutias of Byans and
Chaudans in Almora District, 18 September 1897, Political Department N.W.P. and
Oudh, Proceedings for Dec. 1897, No. 1, RAU, 1.
97 Translation of Peshkar Kharak Singh's Report, 19 August 1897, with Deputy
Commissioner's Orders thereon, 27 August 1897, and the Peshkar's further Report,
Political Department N.W.P. and Oudh, Proceedings for December 1897, No. 4, RAU, 2.
98 Translation of Peshkar Kharak Singh's Report, 19 August 1897, RAU.
99 Government of the N.W.P. and Oudh to the Commissioner of Kumaon,
Communicating Orders on the Subject of the Dues Levied by Thibetans from British
Subjects, 6 December 1897, Political Department N.W.P. and Oudh, Proceedings for
December 1897, No. 13, RAU, 7.
100 J.E. Goudge, Report on the Assessment of Pargana Darma, RAU, 1901, 3.
101 Lieutenant C.E. Bliss, 16 November 1894, RAU, 26.
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C. Bergmann / Journal of Historical Geography 51 (2016) 88e9898‘ambassadors’. The traders' privileges were superseded by the
ruling family of Askot, whose primary task was to move a rather
patchy jurisdictional net towards amore uniform and formal rule of
law.
Conclusion: territoriality, sovereignty and political agency
In Kumaon competing polities have at various times aimed to
extend their inﬂuence into the high valleys inhabited by the re-
gion's trans-Himalayan traders, the Bhotiyas. Before the onset of
British colonial rule in this area, the interactions between the ruling
dynasties of Kumaon, Tibet and Nepal created a regionally arranged
power geometry. Control over the trans-Himalayan trade was a
focus of special attention for these rulers, both in order to regulate
the movement of people and commodities, and to extract some
kind of surplus from it. In that manner the traders were positioned
in a complex geography of graded and partially overlapping shades
of political, economic and cultural authority. Their trade routes
connected different spheres (for example, settlement zones and
polities) and phases (such as agricultural seasons and ritual cycles)
of action. The emerging junctures of this regional ecumene e such
as trade depots or high passes e opened up multiple means of
articulating sovereign claims, strengthening territorial power and
procuring goods. The British added a new force to the negotiations
of sovereignty and territoriality when they conquered the Kumaon
Himalaya in 1815 and gained their ﬁrst direct access route to the
Tibetan plateau.
These negotiations have been examined on the basis of an
analytical approach that is anchored in van Schendel's proposal to
conceive of High Asia as a continuous zone and an agentive site of
political action, which he named Zomia.103 Whereas Scott further
conceptualized Zomia as a ‘non-state space’ with regard to the
mountain regions of South-East Asia, I have followed Shneider-
man's suggestion to envisage the Himalaya as a ‘multiple-state
space’.104 Shneiderman adopts this kind of ‘Zomia-thinking’ to
analyze processes of state- and political subject-formation in the
contact zones between polities that remained independent
throughout the colonial era, namely Nepal and Tibet. Although the
histories and geographies of European colonization and frontier
imperialism also played a role in these settings, the case of Kumaon
provides the alternative analytical focus of a Non-Regulation
Province within Britain's nineteenth-century Indian empire. This
focus has allowed me to illustrate that conﬂuent territories and
overlapping sovereignties are key to understanding imperial fron-
tiers. Whilst the empire's higher-level elites often imagined their
sovereign claims as being inherently territorial, local forms of im-
perial order were marked by a great uncertainty as to who was in
control of both what and where.
The ﬁndings of this article clearly show the limits of British
imperial sovereignty in the Himalaya. During the 1840s the
commissioner accepted these limits owing to the priority of
securing access to the Tibetan plateau and its commercial goods103 van Schendel, Geographies of knowing, 647e668.
104 Shneiderman, Himalayan border citizens, 25e36.through the Bhotiyas' loyalty. In the 1890s these limits were no
longer considered acceptable but they still existed. This was evi-
denced through the maintenance of Tibetan land taxes on the
Bhotiyas, which the traders supported for their own strategic in-
terest. The British solved the resulting problem of conﬂuent terri-
tories by enforcing a strict separation between land taxes and trade
duties, thereby accommodating imperial power and authority to
overlapping sovereignties. Whilst the Tibetans were ofﬁcially
allowed to continue the collection of trade duties from the Bhotiyas
on British territory, local aristocrats were promoted in order, ﬁrstly,
to prevent any unauthorized Tibetan claim to power over the em-
pire's territory and, secondly, to alter the Bhotiyas' cool indifference
toward the colonial government.
The study, therefore, provides some qualiﬁcation to Scott's
analysis of Zomian traders.105 Whilst Scott generally foregrounds
their agency in retaining local autonomy by intentionally resisting
projects of state and empire building, the picture is different in the
speciﬁc case of the Bhotiyas. These trans-Himalayan traders were
adept not only at staying close to Britain's nineteenth-century In-
dian empire, but also in promoting it as a means to raise their own
proﬁts. Moreover, it was the British who nurtured the Bhotiyas'
relative autonomy in order to gain their loyalty and thereby ensure
that imperial interests were satisﬁed. In other words, the study
highlights both the agentive participation of trans-Himalayan
traders in the imperial project and the empire's necessary ﬂexi-
bility in articulating sovereignty at its high altitude frontier.Acknowledgements
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